Concreteness and word production by Hanley, JR et al.
Concreteness and word production
J. Richard Hanley & Rebecka P. Hunt &
Deborah A. Steed & Shannon Jackman
Published online: 27 October 2012
# Psychonomic Society, Inc. 2012
Abstract Two experiments are reported that investigated the
effect of concreteness on the ability to generate words to fit
sentence contexts. When participants attempted to retrieve
words from dictionary definitions in Experiment 1, abstract
words were associated with more omissions and more alter-
nates than were concrete words. These findings are consistent
with the view that the semantic–lexical weights in the word
production system are weaker for abstract than for concrete
words. We found no evidence that greater competition from
semantic neighbors was an additional reason why abstract
words were harder to produce. Participants also reported more
positive tip-of-the-tongue states (TOTs) when attempting to
produce abstract words from their definitions, consistent with
more phonological retrieval problems for abstract than for
concrete words. In Experiment 2, participants attempted to
generate words to fit into a sentence that described a specific
event. The difference between the numbers of abstract and
concrete words recalled was significantly smaller in the event
condition than in the definition condition, and evidence no
longer emerged of greater phonological retrieval failure for
abstract words. Overall, the results are consistent with the
view that the semantic–lexical weights, but not the lexical–
phonological weights, are weaker for abstract than for con-
crete words in the word production system.
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Tip-of-the-tongue states
In this study, we investigated the way in which rated con-
creteness influences the processes that are involved in word
production. Experiments examining the effects on word
production of variables such as frequency and age of acqui-
sition have often employed tests of picture naming (e.g.,
Johnston, Dent, Humphreys, & Barry, 2010). Because it is
not feasible to present abstract words in pictorial form, a few
studies have instead used definition tasks to compare con-
crete and abstract word retrieval (Allen & Hulme, 2006;
Hanley & Kay, 1997; Newton & Barry, 1997). Participants
are presented with dictionary definitions of concrete and
abstract words, and they attempt to recall the word that fits
each definition. Allen and Hulme reported significantly
better concrete than abstract word production on this task,
even though their sets of concrete and abstract words were
matched for frequency, morphemic complexity, age of ac-
quisition, familiarity, neighborhood size, and word length.
As Allen and Hulme (2006) pointed out, generating
words from dictionary definitions involves several distinct
processes. It first requires access to a target word’s semantic
representation in memory. In terms of a model of word
production such as that put forward by Foygel and Dell
(2000), activation of the word’s lexical representation can
then take place from its semantic representation, followed
by activation of the word’s phonological features. Gollan
and Brown (2006) argued that the kinds of errors that
participants make during word production make it possible
to distinguish problems in phonological access from prob-
lems that occur earlier in the word production process. Allen
and Hulme only reported the numbers of correct retrievals
associated with abstract and concrete word production. In
the present study, however, we conducted a detailed analysis
of the kinds of errors that participants made when retrieving
abstract and concrete words, in an attempt to discover the
processing stage(s) that are sensitive to concreteness. The
errors comprise failures to respond (omissions), the produc-
tion of an answer other than the target word (alternates), and
tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) states. During a TOT state, a target
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item feels as if it is about to be retrieved, even though it is
temporarily inaccessible (see Brown, 2012, and Schwartz &
Metcalfe, 2011, for recent reviews). If a participant resolves
a TOT state by producing the target item or subsequently
recognizes the target item as the word that elicited the TOT
state, the experience is classified as a positive TOT. If the
participant had a different word in mind, the experience is
classified as a negative TOT.
Gollan and Brown (2006) argued that omissions, alternates,
and negative TOTs indicate a failure to access either the
semantic or the lexical representation of the target word, which
they term a Step 1 retrieval failure. Their claim is compatible
with Foygel and Dell’s (2000) model of word production. In
this model, omissions reflect a failure to activate sufficiently
strongly any lexical representation (e.g., Dell, Lawler, Harris,
& Gordon, 2004; Laine, Tikkala, & Juhola, 1998). Alternates
reflect activation of the lexical representation of a different
word from the target item, as a result of insufficient activation
of the appropriate lexical representation relative to a competi-
tor. It may be the case that some activation of semantic alter-
nates takes place during phonological mapping. However, the
available evidence (Goldrick, 2006; Nozari, Dell, & Schwartz,
2011) suggests that such activation is weak and that only a
relatively small number of semantic errors occur in Step 2
during phonological access. It is therefore assumed, for the
present purposes, that production of a semantically related
alternate reflects a failure at Step 1 of the retrieval process.
Consistent with several accounts of the etiology of TOT
states (e.g., Meyer & Bock, 1992; Perfect & Hanley, 1992),
Gollan and Brown (2006) argued that a positive TOT means
that appropriate semantic and lexical information about the
target word has been activated, but there has been a failure to
access its associated phonological features. When participants
report a positive TOT, therefore, they are experiencing a
failure at the phonological retrieval stage, which Gollan and
Brown term a Step 2 retrieval failure. In terms of Foygel and
Dell’s (2000) model of word production, Step 2 failure reflects
an inability to fully activate the appropriate output phoneme
units, despite successful activation of the word’s abstract
lexical unit (for further discussion, see Hanley, 2011). A
similar account of TOTs is provided by the discrete two-step
model of production (e.g., Levelt, Roelofs, &Meyer, 1999), in
which activation of phonological candidates only occurs after
abstract lexical activation is complete.
Gollan and Brown (2006) developed some relatively
simple equations that use the incidence of these different
types of errors to distinguish the probability of Step 1 from
Step 2 retrieval failure. They defined the probability of Step
1 failure as the sum of the omissions, alternates, and nega-
tive TOTs, divided by the total number of trials. The prob-
ability of Step 2 failure was defined as the number of
positive TOTs divided by the sum of the positive TOTs
and correct recalls.
Processing advantages associated with concrete words
are generally attributed to differences between the ways in
which concrete and abstract words are represented in se-
mantic memory. According to Paivio’s (1986) dual-code
theory, for example, concrete words are remembered better
in tests of episodic memory because, unlike abstract words,
they can be encoded in terms of both sensory and nonsensory
features. Schwanenflugel and Shoben (1983) argued that the
presence of sensory features means that more contextual infor-
mation is available for the encoding of concrete than of abstract
words. Jones (1985) and Plaut and Shallice (1993) claimed that
these additional features make the semantic representations of
concrete words more resistant than those of abstract words to
the semantic feature loss that occurs as a consequence of brain
injury in conditions such as deep dyslexia.
If concrete words have richer semantic representations
than abstract words do, it follows that the concreteness
effect in the definition task reflects, to some extent at least,
the greater ease with which the semantic representations of
concrete target words are successfully accessed in response
to their definitions. Hanley and Kay’s (1997) study of a
neuropsychological patient with speech output problems
suggested that concreteness can also exert an effect on later
stages of word production. This individual’s word produc-
tion, on tasks including both naming to definition and audi-
tory repetition, was significantly worse when he was asked
to produce words of low rather than high imageability.
These word production problems were not the consequence
of a semantic impairment involving the loss of semantic
features, because this individual showed unimpaired audi-
tory comprehension of low-imageability words. In the ab-
sence of a semantic impairment, it appears that he was
suffering from a problem that disrupted the mapping of
preserved semantic information onto lexical information
during spoken word production. In an attempt to explain
this pattern of performance, Hanley, Dell, Kay, and Baron
(2004) used Foygel and Dell’s (2000) model of speech
production to simulate differences in imageability by vary-
ing the strength of the semantic–lexical connections in the
model. Words of high imageability were assumed to have
relatively strong semantic–lexical weights, and words of
low imageability to have relatively weak semantic–lexical
weights. In Foygel and Dell’s model, this manipulation
leads to weaker activation of lexical units and to the pro-
duction of more alternates and omissions for words of low
than of high imageability.
Newton and Barry (1997) put forward a slightly different
explanation of why abstract words are hard to retrieve in
word production tasks. They also argued that problems with
abstract word production occur after the semantic represen-
tation of the target word has been successfully activated.
Newton and Barry believed that problems arise because
abstract words face particularly strong competition from
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semantically similar words. Because the semantic representa-
tion of an abstract word generally contains relatively few
features, it will typically share a high proportion of its semantic
features with other lexical representations. As a consequence,
the phonological representations of several competitors will
become strongly activated, so a competitor of an abstract word
will be more likely to reach threshold levels of activation than
is the case with competitors of concrete words. Therefore,
more semantic errors will occur for abstract than for concrete
words. Such an account is consistent with recent research by
Mirman and Magnuson (2008) showing that close semantic
neighbors can have an inhibitory effect on a target word during
some lexical-processing tasks. Of course, activation between
the rich semantic representations of concrete words and their
competitors will also take place. Nevertheless, Newton and
Barry argued that a concrete target will contain a higher
proportion of distinctive semantic features and, as a conse-
quence, should be more easily activated to threshold on the
definition task than should any of its competitors (see Cree &
McRae, 2003, for evidence that distinctive semantic features
can improve performance in some word production tasks).
Newton and Barry (1997) therefore believed that the
problems with abstract words on the definition task occur
during lexical access, because more semantic competitors
are activated for abstract words. In a simulation using
Foygel and Dell’s (2000) model, Dell et al. (2004) examined
the effect of varying the number of semantic competitors on
word production. The simulation showed that an additional
semantic competitor made the model produce more seman-
tic errors and fewer omissions. Such an outcome is consis-
tent with evidence from aphasic picture naming (Bormann,
Kulke, Wallesch, & Blanken, 2008) that dense semantic
neighborhoods elicit more semantic alternates but fewer
omissions. So, contrary to Hanley et al. (2004), it follows
from Newton and Barry’s account that more semantic errors
but not more omissions should arise during attempts to
produce abstract words from dictionary definitions.
Our Experiment 1 provided an additional test of Newton
and Barry’s (1997) account. Half of the participants were
provided with information about the number of letters that
each target word contained, alongside its definition. It is likely
that a competitor would often be a word of different length
from the target word. If so, then informing participants about
letter length should be beneficial for word retrieval, because
such knowledge should make it possible to eliminate alter-
nates whenever they contained a different number of letters
from the target word. It follows from Newton and Barry’s
account that such information should be particularly beneficial
for the number of abstract words retrieved, because according
to their model, widespread activation of alternates of abstract
words is the reason why abstract words are harder to produce.
Another important issue is whether concreteness affects the
phonological (Step 2) as well as the semantic and lexical stages
of the word production process. Weak semantic–lexical
weights in an interactive activation model such as that pro-
posed by Foygel and Dell (2000) could easily lead to retrieval
problems at Step 2 as well as at Step 1. Because activation
between the semantic, lexical, and phonemic levels occurs in a
cascade, there will sometimes be sufficient activation of the
lexical representation of an abstract word to partially, but not
fully, activate its phonological representation (see Hanley &
Turner, 2000, for a simulation of the way in which weak
activation at one level in an interactive activation model can
have knock-on effects at subsequent processing stages). Partial
activation of phonological units should be particularly com-
mon for abstract words if their semantic–lexical weights are
relatively weak. It therefore follows that positive TOT experi-
ences should occur more often for abstract than for concrete
words, with a greater probability of Step 2 retrieval failure.
In summary, in Experiment 1 we used Allen and Hulme’s
(2006) word definition task, in which half of the targets were
concrete words and half were abstract, to investigate the
effects of concreteness on word production. Participants were
asked to indicate whether or not they were experiencing a
TOTstate when they failed to recall a word from its definition.
This procedure made it possible to determine whether con-
creteness has its effect at semantic, lexical (Step 1), and
phonological (Step 2) stages of the retrieval process (Gollan
& Brown, 2006). It also made it possible to determine whether
the greater probability of Step 1 failure comes about because
definitions of abstract words elicit more failures to respond,
more alternates, or more examples of both of these types of
error than do concrete words. Finally, half the participants
received information about the number of letters in each target
word, to investigate whether this information would be par-
ticularly helpful for the retrieval of abstract words.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants A group of 56 undergraduate students at the
University of Essex took part and were randomly assigned
to one of two experimental groups. Half of the participants
received information about the letter length of each target
word, and half of the participants did not.
Materials The 68 target words and their definitions were
generated by Allen and Hulme (2006). These included 34
concrete and 34 abstract words, which were matched for
rated age of acquisition, rated word frequency, Kučera–
Francis word frequency, familiarity, neighborhood size,
number of phonemes, and number of letters. The definitions
were taken from several different dictionaries. Allen and
Hulme had used the ratings of six judges on a scale of 1–5
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(high scores 0 high suitability) to closely match the suitabil-
ity of the definitions for the concrete (mean 0 4.74/5) and
abstract (mean 0 4.73/5) target words.
Procedure Participants were given a booklet containing 68
definitions arranged in a random order (half of the partic-
ipants received a different booklet in which the order of the
items was reversed). For example, the definition for dare
(abstract) read, “To challenge someone into doing some-
thing.” The definition for lake (concrete) read, “A large
body of water surrounded on all sides by land.” If partic-
ipants knew the word that fit the definition, they wrote it
down immediately below the definition. If they could not
recall the word, they were asked to indicate whether or not
they were in a TOT state, which was defined as follows: “If
you know the word and feel that you are about to retrieve it
but are unable to bring it to mind at the moment, then please
indicate that you are in a tip-of-the-tongue state.” The par-
ticipants were tested individually and worked through the
booklet at their own pace. They were not allowed to go back
and answer earlier questions once they had moved on to
another definition. If they had indicated a TOT that resolved
spontaneously before they had started to read the next
question, they were allowed to write down the word
that had come to mind. At the end of the experiment,
participants were shown the correct answer for every
question for which they had indicated that they were in a
TOT state. If the participants stated that the target item was
the item for which they had experienced a TOT, the TOTwas
considered to be a positive TOT. If not, it was considered a
negative TOT.
Any response that was not the target word was considered
to be an alternate. In some situations, this meant that very
close synonyms such as insane as a response to the definition
of mad were counted as alternates. We return to this issue in
Experiment 2, which included an attempt to assess how close-
ly the alternates for concrete and abstract words matched the
sentences that were used.
Half of the participants also received information about
the letter length of each target word, in the form of a series
of dashes that indicated the number of letters that each target
contained. Participants were told that the number of dashes
was the same as the number of letters in each target word,
and that this information might help them recall the target
word. These dashes were presented immediately below each
definition.
Results
Table 1 shows the mean performance in Experiment 1 as a
function of concreteness and information about letter length.
Because the data were categorical (see Jaeger, 2008), they
were converted to proportions and underwent an arcsine
transformation before the analyses of variance (ANOVAs)
were carried out.
Correct responses Significantly more concrete than abstract
words were correctly named in response to the definitions,
F(1, 54) 0 510.78, MSE 0 .03, p 0 .001.
Step 1 errors We found a significantly higher overall prob-
ability of Step 1 failure (alternates, omissions, and negative
TOTS) for abstract than for concrete words, F(1, 54) 0
384.84, MSE 0 .04, p 0 .001 (see Table 2). Abstract words
were associated with the production of significantly more
alternative answers than concrete words, F(1, 54) 0 67.23,
MSE 0 .03, p 0 .001. A total of 87.5 % of the alternates were
semantically related to the target word, and the remainder
were phonologically related. Significantly more failures to
respond occurred to definitions of abstract than of concrete
words, F(1, 54) 0 69.55, MSE 0 .03, p 0 .001, and signif-
icantly more negative TOTs occurred for abstract than for
concrete words, F(1, 54) 0 26.85, MSE 0 .01, p 0 .001.
Step 2 errors We found significantly more positive TOTs,
F(1, 54) 0 14.89, MSE 0 .01, p 0 .001, for abstract words.
There was also a significantly higher probability of Step 2
failure [positive TOTs/(correct responses plus positive TOTs)]
for abstract than for concrete words, F(1, 54) 0 23.07,MSE 0
.03, p 0 .001.
Table 1 Mean proportions of different types of responses to the definitions for abstract and concrete target words in Experiment 1
Condition Correctly Named Positive TOTs Negative TOTs No Response Alternate
No letter length information provided
Abstract words .29 (.14) .06 (.07) .06 (.07) .18 (.16) .41 (.21)
Concrete words .68 (.14) .02 (.04) .02 (.04) .08 (.11) .20 (.08)
Letter length information provided
Abstract words .40 (.16) .04 (.06) .07 (.08) .29 (.17) .20 (.11)
Concrete words .77 (.12) .03 (.04) .02 (.03) .10 (.08) .08 (.05)
SDs are in parentheses.
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Effects of letter length cues The number of words correctly
recalled was significantly improved by cues about letter
length, F(1, 54) 0 8.77, MSE 0 .03, p 0 .01. The Cue ×
Concreteness interaction was not significant, F < 1, so no
evidence was apparent that letter length cues helped the
retrieval of abstract more than of concrete words.
Providing a letter length significantly reduced the number
of alternate responses, F(1, 54) 0 31.87,MSE 0 .03, p 0 .001.
The Concreteness × Letter Length interaction was also signif-
icant, F(1, 54) 0 7.71, MSE 0 .01, p 0 .008. Tests of simple
main effects revealed that cues significantly reduced alternates
for both abstract words, F(1, 108) 0 38.62, MSE 0 .02, p 0
.001, and concrete words, F(1, 108) 0 9.10, MSE 0 .02, p 0
.003. The interaction appears to have occurred because letter
length information reduced the number of alternates for ab-
stract words more than for concrete words (see Table 1). In
order to demonstrate this point formally, an analysis compared
the size of the difference between abstract and concrete words
in the number of alternates generated as a function of the
provision of letter length information. The analysis revealed
a significantly larger reduction in the number of alternates for
abstract than for concrete words when cues were provided,
F(1, 54) 0 6.93, MSE 0 22.77, p 0 .01.
Cues had no significant effect on the number of negative
TOTs that were reported (F < 1). Letter length information
increased the number of failures to respond to definitions of
abstract words, F(1, 108) 0 8.14, MSE 0 .02, p 0 .005, but
not of concrete words, F < 1.
A significant Concreteness × Cues interaction emerged for
the probability of Step 2 failure: Cues significantly reduced
Step 2 failure for abstract words, F(1, 108) 0 25.99, MSE 0
.01, p 0 .001, but not for concrete words, F < 1.
Discussion
The results of this experiment replicated the findings of
Allen and Hulme (2006) in that more concrete than abstract
words were correctly named from their dictionary defini-
tions. More importantly, the responses to definitions of
abstract words contained a significantly larger number of
failures to respond, a significantly larger number of seman-
tically related alternates, and significantly more positive and
negative TOT states. In terms of Gollan and Brown’s (2006)
argument, abstract words were more likely to be associated
with failures at both Step 1 (semantic and lexical access) and
Step 2 (access to phonology) of the retrieval process.
The finding that definitions of abstract words elicited
significantly more alternates than did definitions of concrete
words is consistent with Hanley et al.’s (2004) claim that the
semantic–lexical weights are weaker for abstract than for
concrete words. This finding is also consistent with Newton
and Barry’s (1997) claim that there are more semantic com-
petitors for abstract than for concrete words. Nevertheless,
the experiment provided two pieces of evidence that it is
more difficult for participants to activate to threshold any
semantic or lexical representation in response to abstract
word definitions.
First, we obtained significantly more failures to respond to
definitions of abstract words. This finding is inconsistent with
the account put forward by Newton and Barry, because dense
semantic neighborhoods containing many semantic compet-
itors should elicit fewer rather than more omissions (Bormann
et al., 2008; Dell et al., 2004). Second, when participants were
provided with cues as to the number of letters in a word, the
number of correct retrievals increased significantly, and the
probability of failure at Step 1 was significantly reduced.
However, letter length information did not interact significant-
ly with concreteness on either of these two dependent varia-
bles, suggesting that letter length information improved
performance equally for abstract and concrete words. The
significant interaction between these factors on the number
of alternates that participants generated indicated that letter
length information eliminated more competitors of abstract
than of concrete words. So, if abstract target words were hard
to generate solely becausemore semantically related alternates
were brought to mind by definitions of abstract words, then
letter length information should have significantly reduced the
effect of concreteness on the number of target words recalled.
Table 1 suggests an explanation of why letter length
information did not help recall of abstract more than of
concrete items: It appears that provision of letter length
information turned many of the alternate responses for ab-
stract words into omissions rather than correct retrievals. On
these trials, it would appear that participants could not
access another semantic or lexical representation in response
to the definition. Conversely, letter length cues seemed to
turn alternates of concrete words into correct answers, sug-
gesting that an alternative semantic or lexical representation
for a concrete word (in this case, the target word) could be
accessed relatively easily.
In conclusion, as Newton and Barry (1997) claimed,
semantic competitors are produced on many trials when
Table 2 Probabilities of failure at Steps 1 and 2 (Gollan & Brown,
2006) for abstract and concrete target words in Experiment 1
Condition No Letter Length
Information
Letter Length
Information
Probability of Step 1 failure
Abstract words .65 (.13) .56 (.16)
Concrete words .30 (.14) .20 (.11)
Probability of Step 2 failure
Abstract words .17 (.22) .08 (.13)
Concrete words .03 (.05) .03 (.05)
SDs are in parentheses.
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participants attempt to produce abstract words from defini-
tions. However, the fundamental problem appears to be that
the abstract word definitions often failed to activate the
appropriate lexical representation particularly strongly, con-
sistent with weak semantic–lexical weights for abstract
words (Hanley et al., 2004). The consequence of weak
activation was significantly more omissions and alternates
for abstract than for concrete words. Contrary to the account
put forward by Newton and Barry, therefore, the large
number of semantic alternates elicited by the definitions of
abstract words seems more likely to be a consequence of
weak lexical access than evidence of its cause. We will
return to this issue in Experiment 2, in which we attempted
to directly assess the strength of semantic competition by
examining whether the alternates that participants generated
fit the definitions of the abstract words better than those of
the concrete words.
The increased probability of positive TOTs and of failure
at Step 2 of the retrieval process for abstract words suggests
that even when the correct semantic and lexical representa-
tion has been activated, the phonological representation of
an abstract target word is relatively difficult to retrieve. As
was explained in the introduction, in a cascade model such
as that of Foygel and Dell (2000), it might be the case that
the Step 2 problems with abstract words are an inevitable
consequence of weaker activation of the lexical representa-
tions for abstract target words during Step 1 (Hanley et al.,
2004). An alternative explanation of reduced phonological
activation is that abstract words are associated with inde-
pendent problems at both Steps 1 and 2 of the word pro-
duction process, as appears to be the case for words of low
frequency (see Kittredge, Dell, Verkuilen, & Schwartz,
2008). In a model such as that put forward by Burke and
Shafto (2004), for example, abstract words might suffer
from a phonological transmission deficit whereby lexical-
to-phonological weights are significantly weaker for ab-
stract than for concrete words, over and above the problems
with lexical access for abstract words. Experiment 2 was
designed to investigate this issue further.
Probability of Step 2 failure for abstract words was sig-
nificantly reduced by letter length information. In previous
research, Heine, Ober, and Shenaut (1999) showed that
when combined with initial letters, letter length information
resolved 34 % of the reported TOTs elicited by definitions.
It appears that letter length information facilitated phono-
logical access in Experiment 1 also, although the precise
mechanism by which this occurred is still an open question.
We found no similar effect with definitions of concrete
words, presumably because they elicited so few Step 2 fail-
ures, even when letter length information was not provided.
It is also noteworthy that letter length information did not
reduce the number of negative TOTs reported for abstract
words. Presumably, letter length information is not useful in
resolving a TOT state in these circumstances because the
word that elicits a negative TOT often contains a different
number of letters from the target word. This finding also
suggests that participants do not have access to the number
of letters in the word that is eliciting a negative TOT; if they
did, they would realize that it could not be the target word.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we attempted to design a word production
task in which it would be easier to access the semantic and
lexical representations of abstract words than it had been from
their definitions in Experiment 1. Crutch and Warrington
(2005) argued that concrete words tend to be represented in
memory by a particular set of semantic features. Conversely,
they claimed that abstract words are more likely to be repre-
sented in semantic memory in terms of their associative con-
nections with other words. Consistent with these claims, a
series of neuropsychological investigations and a number of
studies with unimpaired participants have shown that abstract
words are more efficiently processed in associative contexts,
whereas concrete words are better processed in the context of
semantically similar items such as members of the same
semantic category (e.g., Crutch, Connell, & Warrington,
2009; Crutch & Jackson, 2011).
If it is assumed that retrieval from definitions depends
heavily on an attempt to recall a word on the basis of its
semantic features, it follows that the naming-to-definition task
would likely prove particularly difficult for abstract words.
The way in which words are retrieved during normal language
production, however, is in the context of a sentence in which
there are often rich associative connections between each
word and the sentence context in which it appears. In
Experiment 2, therefore, we gave participants sentences that
described events in which an abstract word was missing (e.g.,
In court, Joan entered a _______ of “not guilty” to the crime
she was accused of) and sentences in which a concrete word
was missing (e.g., Jason played a game of _______ on the
famous links). Participants were asked to try and generate the
word that best fit into that sentence (plea and golf, respective-
ly, in the sentences above).
We assume that the retrieval of a word’s lexical represen-
tation from an event context such as these will reflect a
greater influence of associative processing and a weaker
influence of semantic similarity than is the case for the
definition task. If so, it then follows from Crutch and
Warrington (2005) that the problems associated with the
production of abstract words (fewer correct retrievals and
increased probability of Step 1 failure relative to concrete
words) may be reduced or eliminated when they have to be
retrieved from an event context. Should the differences
between the probabilities of Step 1 failure be reduced
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significantly, a key question would then be whether the
probability of phonological retrieval failure (Step 2) would
remain substantially greater for abstract than for concrete
words. If the connection between the lexical and phonolog-
ical levels in the production system is a primary problem for
abstract words, then significant phonological retrieval prob-
lems would remain even if the Step 1 problems with abstract
words were resolved. Conversely, if the phonological access
problems for abstract words occur because the lexical rep-
resentations of such words are activated strongly enough to
elicit a TOT but not the target word, then higher levels of
Step 2 retrieval failure for abstract words should no longer
be observed.
Method
Participants A group of 58 undergraduate students at the
University of Essex took part in the experiment. None of
them had been participants in Experiment 1. Half were
randomly allocated to the definition condition and half to
the event condition.
Materials For participants in the definition condition, the
presentation was the same as in Experiment 1, except that
none of the participants received any letter length informa-
tion. For participants in the event condition, the definitions
used in Experiment 1 were replaced by new sentences that
described a simple event. These sentences were generated so
as to create a context in which the target word was highly
predictable. However, no attempt was made to match the
degree of lexical association between the target and any of
the words in the concrete and abstract event sentences. The
sentences were given to six new participants with the target
word underlined to ensure that the concrete and abstract
words were equally congruent with their sentence contexts.
These participants were therefore asked to indicate on a
scale of 1–5 how well each underlined target word fit into
the sentence in which it appeared (1 0 very poorly, 5 0 very
well). The overall mean (with SD) for the concrete sentences
was 4.75 (0.23), and the overall mean for the abstract
sentences was 4.73 (0.26). These means did not differ sig-
nificantly, t(66) 0 0.33 p 0 .742. These suitability ratings
were very similar to those provided for the definitions by
Allen and Hulme’s (2006) participants (see Exp. 1 for
details). The Appendix provides details of all of the event
sentences that were used in Experiment 2. Three new words
that were similar in meaning to each target word were
generated specifically for use as recognition test foils in this
experiment.
Procedure Participants were given a set of 68 sentences in
which a word was missing. They were told that their task
was to produce the word that best fit into that sentence
context. If they were unable to recall the word, they were
asked to indicate whether they were experiencing a TOT
state, exactly as in Experiment 1. At the end of the experi-
ment, the participants undertook a recognition test for those
items for which they had experienced a TOT. They heard the
sentence and were shown four words on a computer screen.
For example, the foils for dare were provoke, bully, and goad,
and the foils for lake were pool, lagoon, and spring. They
were asked to indicate whether any of the four words was the
item that had previously elicited their TOT state. It was em-
phasized that their task was not to indicate which was the item
that they now believed best fit the definition. If the participants
selected the target item, the TOT was considered to be a
positive TOT. If they selected a foil or stated that none of
the four words had elicited their TOT, it was considered a
negative TOT.
Results
Number correct Performance in Experiment 2 is summarized
in Tables 3 and 4. There was a significant effect of concrete-
ness, F(1, 58) 0 127.31, MSE 0 .05, p 0 .00001, and signif-
icantly more words were correctly recalled from event than
from definition sentences, F(1, 58) 0 50.51, MSE 0 .05, p 0
.001. The interaction was also highly significant, F(1, 58) 0
16.01, MSE 0 .05, p 0 .001. Tests of simple main effects
showed a significant effect of concreteness in both the
Table 3 Mean proportions of different types of responses for abstract and concrete target words in Experiment 2
Condition Correctly Named Positive TOTs Negative TOTs No Response Alternate
Definition sentences
Abstract words .28 (.11) .06 (.05) .11 (.12) .21 (.12) .35 (.10)
Concrete words .55 (.17) .06 (.07) .05 (.07) .10 (.10) .23 (.08)
Event sentences
Abstract words .60 (.14) .03 (.04) .02 (.03) .05 (.08) .30 (.08)
Concrete words .71 (.16) .03 (.04) .02 (.04) .06 (.09) .19 (.09)
SDs are in parentheses.
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definition, F(1, 16) 0 116.81, MSE 0 .05, p 0 .001, and
event, F(1, 16) 0 26.51, MSE 0 .05, p 0 .001, condi-
tions. The interaction seems to have come about because the
concreteness effect was larger in the definition than in the
event condition. To demonstrate this point formally, an anal-
ysis compared the sizes of the advantage for concrete words in
the two conditions. This revealed a significantly larger advan-
tage for concrete words in the definition than in the event
condition, F(1, 58) 0 28.95, MSE 0 17.63, p 0 .001.
Step 1 failure We found a significantly higher probability of
Step 1 failure for abstract than for concrete words, F(1, 58) 0
176.53, MSE 0 .04, p 0 .001, and a significantly higher
probability of Step 1 failure in the definition than in the event
condition, F(1, 58) 0 49.63, MSE 0 .04, p 0 .001. There was
also a significant interaction, F(1, 58) 0 45.10,MSE 0 .04, p 0
.001. As with the number of correct responses, the interaction
seems to reflect a stronger effect of concreteness in the defi-
nition than in the event condition.
Significantly fewer alternates were reported in the event
than in the definition condition, F(1, 58) 0 7.70, MSE 0 .01,
p 0 .007. As in Experiment 1, more alternates were pro-
duced in response to sentences about abstract than about
concrete words, F(1, 58) 0 72.84, MSE 0 .01, p 0 .001. The
interaction between these factors was not significant.
Significantly fewer failures to respond occurred in the event
than in the definition condition, F(1, 58) 0 17.87, MSE 0
.02, p 0 .001, and significantly more failures to respond
occurred for abstract than for concrete words, F(1, 58) 0
23.73, MSE 0 .02, p 0 .001. The interaction was significant,
F(1, 58) 0 29.93, MSE 0 .02, p 0 .001, with tests of simple
main effects revealing a concreteness effect in the definition
condition, F(1, 116) 0 53.48,MSE 0 .01, p 0 .001, but not in
the event condition, F < 1.
We found significantly more negative TOTs in the defi-
nition than in the event condition, F(1, 58) 0 14.11, MSE 0
.01, p 0 .001. The effect of concreteness on negative TOTs
was also significant, F(1, 58) 0 9.20,MSE 0 .01, p 0 .004, as
was the interaction, F(1, 58) 0 8.05, MSE 0 .01, p 0 .006.
Tests of simple main effects revealed a significant effect of
concreteness in the definition, F(1, 116) 0 17.23,MSE 0 .01,
p 0 .001, but not in the event, F < 1, sentences.
Step 2 failure Most importantly, we found a significantly
higher probability of Step 2 failure for abstract than for
concrete words F(1, 58) 0 9.43, MSE 0 .03, p 0 .003, and
significantly higher probability of Step 2 failure in the
definition than in the event condition, F(1, 58) 0 9.59,
MSE 0 .04, p 0 .003. The interaction was also significant,
F(1, 58) 0 4.63, MSE 0 .03, p 0 .04: Tests of simple main
effects showed a significant effect of concreteness with
definitions, F(1, 116) 0 13.64, MSE 0 .02, p 0 .001, but
not with event sentences. Significantly more positive TOTs
were reported in the definition condition than in the event
condition, F(1, 58) 0 6.82, MSE 0 .02, p 0 .01, but no effect
of concreteness and no significant interaction appeared, both
Fs < 1.
Word category Although Allen and Hulme’s (2006) set of
abstract and concrete words were matched on a number of
important variables, they were not matched for word cate-
gory. Whereas all of the concrete words were nouns, the
abstract words comprised nine adjectives, 11 nouns, and 14
verbs. We therefore investigated whether we could find any
evidence in Experiment 2 that the observed differences in
performance were caused by word category rather than
concreteness.
In the definition condition, the probabilities of Step 1
failure were .78 for abstract adjectives, .72 for abstract
nouns, and .57 for abstract verbs. These values are all much
higher than the probability of Step 1 failure for concrete
words (.39). The probabilities of Step 2 failure were .17 for
abstract adjectives, .22 for abstract nouns, and .10 for ab-
stract verbs, so the value for Step 2 failure for abstract nouns
was descriptively higher than that for concrete words (.10).
In the event condition, the probabilities of Step 1 failure
were .36 for abstract adjectives, .32 for abstract nouns, and
.41 for abstract verbs, as compared to .26 for the concrete
words. Although these results suggest that the event condi-
tion may have been particularly beneficial for abstract adjec-
tives and nouns, evidence remains of an advantage for
concrete relative to abstract nouns, verbs, and adjectives.
The probabilities of Step 2 failure in the abstract condition
were .02 for adjectives, .06 for nouns, and .03 for verbs, as
compared to .04 in the concrete word condition.
Strength of semantic competitors An attempt was made to
investigate whether the abstract and concrete target words
faced equally strong semantic competitors during word pro-
duction in Experiment 2. Additional data were therefore col-
lected to determine how well the most frequent alternates to
the target words fit into the event and definition sentences. A
Table 4 Probabilities of failure at Steps 1 and 2 (Gollan & Brown,
2006) for abstract and concrete target words in Experiment 2
Condition Definition
Sentences
Event
Sentences
Probability of Step 1 failure
Abstract words .67 (.10) .37 (.12)
Concrete words .39 (.13) .26 (.15)
Probability of Step 2 failure
Abstract words .19 (.19) .06 (.10)
Concrete words .10 (.14) .04 (.06)
SDs are in parentheses.
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group of 16 new participants, drawn from the same population
as those who took part in the main experiment, were shown
each of the definition sentences together with three words.
One of the words was the target word, and the other two words
were the most frequent alternates produced by participants in
the definition condition in the main experiment. The partic-
ipants were asked to indicate how well each of these words fit
into its corresponding sentence on a scale of 1–5, where 5 0
very well and 1 0 very badly. A further 15 new participants
were shown the target word and the two most frequent alter-
nates produced by participants for the event sentences in the
main experiment and rated how well each of these words fit
into its corresponding sentence, on the same 1–5 scale.
The mean ratings are shown in Table 5. In the event condi-
tion, a significant effect of type of word emerged, F(2, 66) 0
162.2,MSE 0 .54, p 0 .001, but no effect of concreteness, F <
1, and no significant interaction, F < 1. Newman–Keuls tests
revealed that the target words received significantly higher
ratings than did the highest-rated alternate, which in turn re-
ceived higher ratings than the second alternate (both ps < .01).
In the definition condition, we found a significant effect of
concreteness, F(1, 66) 0 14.65, MSE 0 .57, p 0 .001, a signif-
icant effect of type of word, F(2, 66) 0 150.81,MSE 0 .57, p 0
.001, and a significant interaction,F(2, 66) 0 15.71,MSE 0 .54,
p 0 .001. Newman–Keuls tests revealed no significant effect of
concreteness on the ratings given to the concrete and abstract
target words. However, the alternate words in the abstract
sentences were given significantly higher ratings than were
the alternate words in the concrete condition (p < .01).
What these findings reveal is that the abstract and con-
crete target words fit equally well into the definition senten-
ces and into the event sentences. Such an outcome is
consistent with the normative data collected for the event
sentences prior to Experiment 2, as well as with the norma-
tive data collected for the definitions by Allen and Hulme
(2006). No evidence emerged from the analyses that the
abstract target words faced greater competition from alter-
nates than did the concrete words in the event sentences.
The situation was somewhat different for the definition
sentences, however. Here, the alternates for abstract target
words were seen as fitting the definitions better than the
alternates to the concrete words did . It therefore appears
that abstract words in the definition condition may face
stronger competition from alternates than do the concrete
target words.
Discussion
In Experiment 2, the effect of concreteness on the propor-
tion of words correctly retrieved was significantly smaller
when participants were asked to produce words from event
sentences than when they were asked to produce words from
dictionary definitions. The use of event sentences seemed,
therefore, to have had the desired effect of substantially
improving the probability that the semantic and lexical
representations of abstract words would be successfully
activated relative to concrete words. The critical issue was
whether differences would remain between abstract and
concrete words in terms of Step 2 (phonological) retrieval.
As in Experiment 1, we again found a significantly
greater probability of Step 2 failure for abstract than for
concrete words in the definition task. One possibility is that
this effect arose because of weaker connections between the
lexical and phonological levels in the word production sys-
tem for abstract than for concrete words. If this was indeed
the case, concreteness should have exerted an effect on the
probability of Step 2 failure when the task was to retrieve
words from event scenarios. However, the results of
Experiment 2 revealed no significant effect of concreteness
on the probability of Step 2 failure in the event condition. It
therefore appears that the increased probability of Step 2
failure for abstract words in the definition condition was a
direct consequence of the weaker activation of an abstract
word’s lexical representation from its dictionary definition.
When the semantic and lexical activation of abstract words
was increased by presenting event sentences instead of
definitions, abstract words were no longer associated with
a greater probability of Step 2 retrieval failure.
It might be argued that this interaction came about be-
cause of a floor effect in the number of TOTs in the event
condition. However, Table 4 shows that the probability of
Step 1 failure for abstract words in the event condition was
similar to that of Step 1 failure for concrete words in the
definition condition. This suggests approximately equiva-
lent levels of lexical access in these two conditions. If there
were an independent phonological retrieval problem for
abstract words, then a greater probability of Step 2 failures
for abstract than for concrete words should have been ob-
served in these two conditions. As Table 4 shows, this was
clearly not the case. Experiment 2, therefore, provided no
evidence for an independent problem with abstract words at
Step 2 of the word production process, as appears to be the
situation for words of low frequency (Kittredge et al., 2008).
Table 5 Participants’ ratings of how well the target word and alter-
nates fit into the definition and event sentences (1 0 very badly,
5 0 very well)
Condition Target 1st Alternate 2nd Alternate
Definitions
Abstract words 4.24 3.62 2.80
Concrete words 4.59 2.91 1.94
Events
Abstract words 4.71 3.25 2.15
Concrete words 4.70 3.25 2.44
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Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that for the present
study we used only binary measures. One cannot rule out
the possibility that more continuous measures, such as re-
action times, might reveal more subtle effects of concrete-
ness on Step 2 retrieval.
The difference that remained between the correct retrieval
of abstract and concrete words in the event condition was
directly related to the larger number of alternates that partic-
ipants generated for abstract words. A possible explanation for
the large number of remaining alternates is that the abstract
words may have had more synonyms than the concrete words.
However, the additional normative data collected at the end of
Experiment 2 provided no evidence that the most common
alternates for abstract words in the event condition were more
closely related to the meaning of the event sentences than were
the most common alternates for the concrete words. Because
we found no evidence that abstract words faced more compe-
tition from competitors in the event condition, it therefore
appears that the greater number of alternates produced in the
abstract word condition is a consequence of the failure to
access the correct lexical representation as a result of weak
semantic–lexical weights (Hanley et al., 2004).
In the definition condition, however, participants did rate
the most common alternatives to the abstract target words as
being more compatible with the definitions than the most
common alternatives to the concrete target words. This
observation is consistent with Newton and Barry’s (1997)
claim that abstract words are difficult to retrieve in the
definition task because they face stronger competition from
semantic neighbors. It seems unlikely, however, that this is
one of the reasons why abstract words were worse recalled.
If this had been the case, a larger effect of concreteness on
the number of alternates produced should have been ob-
served in the definition condition than in the event condi-
tion. In fact, though, this interaction failed to approach
significance. The poor retrieval of abstract relative to con-
crete words in Experiment 2 is therefore explicable solely in
terms of weaker semantic–lexical weights for abstract words
(Hanley et al., 2004); there is no need to suggest that
interference from competitors of abstract words plays an
important additional role. As in Experiment 1, the evidence
suggests that the increased number of alternates is a conse-
quence rather than a cause of poor lexical retrieval of ab-
stract words. Nevertheless, the finding that the alternates of
abstract words were considered to fit the definitions so well
merits further investigation. No independent formal evi-
dence has been found that abstract words have more syno-
nyms, although the use of latent semantic analysis
(Hoffman, Rogers, & Lambon Ralph, 2011) has clearly
established that abstract words have more senses, and there-
fore are more ambiguous than concrete words. This would
be an interesting issue for future research on latent semantic
analysis to address.
Although we do not have any direct measure of the
degree of association between the target words and the event
sentences, it seems reasonable to assume that recalling
words in response to specific events is likely to require more
associative processing and less featural processing than
recalling words from their definitions. Consequently, the
significantly greater improvement in the retrieval of abstract
than of concrete words in the event condition provides some
support for the views of Crutch and Warrington (2005) that
abstract words tend to be represented in semantic memory in
terms of their associative connections with other words
rather than of their semantic features. Nevertheless, recall
of concrete words did improve to some extent in the event
condition. So, as Crutch and Warrington maintained, any
differential dependence of concrete and abstract words on
associative and featural information appears to be relative
rather than absolute. An alternative explanation of the great-
er improvement for abstract words would be the presence of
a ceiling effect in performance for concrete words in the
event condition. Although it is impossible to entirely dis-
miss this possibility, the similarity of the standard deviations
for concrete words correctly recalled from the definition and
event sentences suggests that performance had not reached
ceiling in the event condition (see Table 3).
Finally, the Experiment 2 Results section provided some
evidence that word category might have had an influence on
performance in Experiment 2. For example, although Step 1
retrieval in the event condition was consistently more diffi-
cult for abstract than for concrete words regardless of word
category, the effect was descriptively smaller for nouns and
adjectives than for verbs, and it appeared that Step 1 access
might be more difficult for abstract verbs than for abstract
nouns or adjectives. This outcome must be treated with
caution, as the items from these different word categories
were not equated on variables such as frequency or age of
acquisition. Nevertheless, the effects of word category on
lexical retrieval in the event and definition tasks would be an
interesting issue for future research to address.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the results of this study have shown that poor
performance during attempts to retrieve abstract words from
their dictionary definitions (Allen & Hulme, 2006) is asso-
ciated with more omissions, more alternates, and more
TOTs than is the case for concrete words. These findings
indicate that problems are associated with abstract words at
both Step 1 (semantic–lexical) and Step 2 (phonological)
(Gollan & Brown, 2006) of the word production process
during performance of this task. These results can all be
explained by the assumption (Hanley et al., 2004) that
semantic–lexical weights in the word production system
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are stronger for concrete than for abstract words. When
semantic and lexical access was improved for abstract words
in Experiment 2 by the use of event scenarios rather than
definitions, the phonological problems disappeared. This
finding was interpreted as evidence that lexical–phonologi-
cal weights are as strong for abstract as for concrete words.
Consistent with the views of Newton and Barry (1997), we
found evidence that abstract words face stronger competi-
tors than do concrete words on the definition task. No
evidence was apparent, however, that the greater activation
of competitors is a cause of poor abstract word retrieval.
Appendix
Event sentences used in Experiment 2
Concrete words:
(ash) The city was covered in ______ after the
volcano started to erupt.
(bar) Stacey used a _____ of soap to wash her hands
before eating her lunch.
(bomb) Disposal experts were asked to detonate
a _____ from World War 2.
(branch) James hung the swing from a _______ of the
tree in his back garden.
(card) John signed a _____ for his girlfriend
Lisa’s birthday.
(coat) When it got cold, Phil buttoned up his _______
to keep himself warm.
(cream) After their dinner, Frank and Laura had dessert
of strawberries with _______.
(deck) In the emergency, the ship’s captain called for
all passengers to assemble on the _____.
(drug) The doctor prescribed Sarah a _______ that
had just passed its clinical trials.
(edge) When Emma reached the top, she could stand
at the ________ of the cliff.
(gate) Henry came up the path and opened the_______
to enter his front garden.
(gin) Fred poured chilled tonic water into his
glass of ____.
(golf) Jason played a game of _____ on the
famous links.
(hen) Anne’s _______ laid a large number of eggs
for her to sell.
(horn) While trying to escape the angry bull, the tip
of it’s _____ caught on Sean’s shirt.
(jail) Will went to _______ after being caught
breaking the law.
(jet) The fighter aircraft was powered by the
latest _____ engine.
(key) Jane used the _____ to open the door to
Wendy’s house.
(knee) The footballer tore the cartilage in his _______,
which ended his career.
(lake) Nicola stayed in a log cabin which was by
a _____ where she would go swimming.
(lift) Peter entered the _____ to go up to the 10th
floor to his hotel room.
(lock) Frank put a ________ on the door to secure
the room from his houseguests.
(map) After taking a wrong turning, Paul used
a _________ to find his way home.
(moon) When walking home at night, Alan saw
the ________ and stars come out.
(net) The fisherman was pleased when he saw the
number of fish caught in his _______.
(pipe) The water gushed down the ________ to fill
up the drain.
(plate) Katie put too much food on her _______ and
could not finish it all.
(plug) The TV did not work because the _______ was
not in the socket.
(rake) The gardener used a _____ to gather up the
leaves and tidy the garden.
(ranch) Hank kept all his cattle on a ____________
in Texas.
(tape) In 1950, the speech was recorded onto
a __________ so that it could be heard
many times in the future.
(tent) Julie and Ben slept in a ________ when they
went camping.
(van) Patrick had to hire a ______ to move some
large furniture to his new flat.
(wave) A ________ swept Dan overboard
into the sea.
Abstract words:
(aim) Bill had to _________ the loaded gun at
the target.
(bid) Rick placed a ________ for a painting at
the auction.
(blame) Jenny did not __________ Mike for the
accident, even though she had been injured.
(brave) For being ______ while getting an injection,
Sammy’s mum bought him sweets.
(calm) Throughout the crisis, Sue remained
___________ and clear-headed.
(choose) Harry’s tough decision was to ________
which girl to take to the cinema.
(cope) Mary was unable to ________ with her
children when they were being naughty.
(dare) As a __________, Jim tried to walk on the
electric train track.
(drop) The fielder was embarrassed to ________
the cricket ball.
(ease) Kenny took a soothing tablet to ______ the
pain in his head.
(glad) Dawn was _______ to be home from her
holiday because she missed her friends
and family.
(grade) Charlie was awarded a _____ of B in his
Maths A-Level.
(halt) The car came to a_________ at the stop sign.
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